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In the Sophistichi eknchi, Aristotle identifies thirteen
types of fallacies or ways one can go wrong in arguing. According to
Aristotle, of these fallacies, six come about in language, and seven are
independent of language.1 The six in language can be characterized
as types of ambiguity that arise because of the peculiarities of natu-
ral language. These types of ambiguity are equivocation, amphiboly,
composition, division, accent, and figura dictionis. The seven ways
independent of language in which one can go wrong in arguing can
be characterized as arising because of the limited mental capacity of
human beings. And these ways of going wrong are accident, affirming
the consequent, begging the question, many questions, treating as
cause what is not the cause, secundum quid et simpliciterf and ignora-
tio elenchi.
At the beginning of the twelfth century, with the recovery of the
Sophistichi elenchi in the Latin West, philosophers became particularly
interested in the six types of ambiguity that Aristotle identifies as
coming about in language—those of composition and division more so
than the others. One reason for the latter may have been the difficulty
people had in recognizing and therefore avoiding bad arguments based
on composition and division. Another may have been the philosophi-
cal usefulness a recognition of composition and division afforded. For
1. Sophistici elenchi 4 (165b24ff. and 166b20ff.).
142
OCKHAM AND AMBIGUITY 143
example, the following sort of argument for the incompatibility of
divine foreknowledge of human actions and human freedom would
have been considered a failure by most medievals because it depends
on a premise that is ambiguous with respect to composition and
division:
(1) Whatever must be the case is not subject to human free will.
(2) Whatever must be the case is necessarily true, and whatever is
necessarily true must be the case.
(3) Whatever is known by God necessarily is true.
(4) God, who is omniscient, knows our future actions.
(5) Therefore, our future actions must occur.
(6) Therefore, our future actions are not subject to our free will.
Premise (3) is ambiguous with respect to composition and division
because the modal operator 'necessarily' can govern2 either the word
'true' or the sentence 'Whatever is known by God is true'. When it
governs 'true', the sense of the premise is that whatever God knows
is a necessary truth, or that if God knows that p, then necessarily
p. When it governs 'Whatever is known by God is true', the sense
of the premise is that 'Whatever God knows is true' is a necessary
truth, or that it is necessarily the case that if God knows that p
then p. The sense resulting when 'necessarily' governs 'Whatever is
known by God is true' would have been taken to be true insofar as it
expresses the fundamental truth that whatever one knows is true. On
the other hand, the sense resulting when 'necessarily' governs 'true'
would have been taken to be false on the incompatibilist conviction
that people sometimes act freely, and that actions performed on those
occasions are not causally necessitated. Thus, the medievals could
avoid accepting (6) by maintaining that the argument resulting when
(3) is taken in its true sense is invalid, and that the argument resulting
when (3) is taken in its other sense is valid but unsound.
One can see, then, how having a basic understanding of compos
sition and division would be important to the scholastics. So it is
hardly surprising that, between the beginning of the twelfth century
and the end of the fifteenth, more than one account of the nature of
composition and division was put forward. William Ockham offers an
2. Here the word 'govern' means 'modify', but is intended to designate a genus of
grammatical relationships of which modification is only one.
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account that differs in two important respects from earlier accounts,
and I would like to discuss that account here. My focus will be on what
he takes to be the defining characteristics of composition and division,
and what he seems to take to be the link between composition and





Ockham gives his most detailed account of composition
and division in his Summa logicae and Expositio super libros Eίen-
chorum.3 According to him, composition and division are ambiguities
which arise when (a) a written or spoken expression can have different
senses simply in virtue of different punctuations or pronunciations
of the words in that expression,^ and (b) the expression has no
sense independently of being punctuated or pronounced in one way
or another.5 For example, the expression 'Whoever lives always is'
(Quicumque vivit semper est) is taken by Ockham to have neither
the sense it has when it is punctuated 'Whoever lives always, is'
nor the sense it has when it is punctuated 'Whoever lives, always
is'. In the first case, the word 'always' governs 'lives', and the sense
is that whoever has sempiternal life exists—which is true. In the
second case, 'always' governs 'is', and the sense is that whoever lives
exists sempiternally—which is false. Ockham stresses that the source
3. William of Ockham, Summa logicae
 f in Opera philosophica et theologica ad fidem
codicum manuscriptorum, Opera philosophica 1, ed. Philotheus Boehner, Gedeon GaΊ,
and Steven F. Brown (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1974). The
relevant portion is 3-4.8. William of Ockham, Expositio super libros Eίenchorum, in
Opera philosophica 3, ed. Francesco del Punta (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan
Institute, 1979). The relevant portion is 1.3.6.
4. William of Sherwood describes composition and division in this way in his
lntroductiones in logicam, and so does the anonymous author of FaUacie Parvipontane.
See William Sherwood's Introduction to Logic, trans. Norman Kretzmann (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1966), and Logica Modernorum: A Contribution to the
History of Early Terminist Logic, ed. L. M. de Rijk, vol. 1 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1962).
5. Super lib. Elench. 1.3.6 (del Punta 34.3-10).
OCKHAM AND AMBIGUITY 145
of the compounded/divided ambiguity is the possibility of different
punctuation or pronunciation. He insists on the error of those who say
that expressions such as the following can be distinguished according
to composition and division: Ά white thing can be black' (Album
potest esse nigrum), 'An impossible thing can be true' (Impossibile potest
esse verum),6 and Έvery man of necessity is an animaP (Omnis homo
de necessitate est animal). The different senses of these expressions
cannot be sorted out by means of different punctuation (or pro-
nunciation). In Ockham's view, distinguishability of senses on the
basis of different punctuation or pronunciation is what differentiates
the compounded/divided ambiguity from amphiboly.7 An example of
amphiboly is Ί hope that you the enemy may capture' (Pugnantes
vellem te accipere). Given the rules of Latin grammar, the word for
'you' can be either the subject or the object of the subordinate verb.
The utterance thus has two senses—one in which my wish is that you
capture the enemy, one in which my wish is that the enemy captures
you. These two senses cannot, however, be brought out on the basis
of punctuation or pronunciation.
In addition to maintaining that composition and division arise
when and only when a written or spoken expression can have different
senses in virtue of different punctuation or pronunciation, Ockham
maintains that there are two modes (or sorts) of composition and
division. One mode occurs when the ambiguous expression is in
each of its senses categorical, or is in each of its senses hypothetical.
Another mode occurs when the sense of composition is categorical
and the sense of division is hypothetical.8 A categorical sentence
has one subject, one predicate, and one copula. An example would
6. Walter Burley, for one, uses these two expressions as examples of compounded/
divided ambiguous expressions in De puritate artis logicae tract, brev., ed. Philotheus
Boehner (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1955), pp. 24Off.
7. Super Ub. Elench. 1.3.6 (del Punta 34.15-21): "Nam manifeste patet quod in
talibus [sal, propositionibus] non potest esse diversa punctuatio propter quam possent
diversi sensus causari, quod tamen necessario requiritur [si compositio et divisio est],
et in hoc maxime differt ab amphibolia." See also Super lib. Elench. 2.5.3 (del Punta
179.8-17).
8. Summa log. 3.4.8 (Boehner 786.12-787.21); compare Super lib. Elench. 1.3.6
(del Punta 35.38-41). One might wonder why Ockham does not mention the other
possibility; namely, that one mode (a third) of composition and division arises when
the compounded sense is hypothetical and the divided sense is categorical. This
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be 'Socrates is running'. A hypothetical sentence is composed of
two or more categorical sentences joined by at least one adverb or
conjunction. Examples would be 'While Socrates is running, Plato
is disputing', 'If Socrates is running, Plato is disputing', 'Socrates is
running or Plato is disputing', 'Since Socrates is running, Plato is
disputing, and Cicero is writing'.9 Ockham thinks that this aspect
of his account of composition and division in terms of categoricals
and hypotheticals is supported by the examples Aristotle gives in the
Sophistichi eίenc/ιi.10
In Summa logicae, Ockham organizes his discussion of examples of
compounded/divided ambiguous expressions under the just-mentioned
modes of composition and division, although he does not explic-
itly identify the categorical or hypothetical sentences expressing the
senses of his examples. I take it, however, that the expression 'Who-
ever lives always is' is an example of the first mode of composition and
division, since it seems that in each of its senses it is a categorical
sentence: 'Every sempiternally living person is an existent person',
and 'Every living person is a sempiternally existent person'.11 On the
characterization of composition and division, which seems to be unique to Ockham,
needs to be strengthened from 'is' to 'must be'. See note 11 below.
9. See Summa log. 2.1 and 2.30.
10. Super lib. Elench. (del Punta 35.41-42). For the examples of compounded/
divided expressions given by Aristotle, see Sophistici eknchi 4 (166a23-37) and 20
(177a33-177b34).
11. Someone might suppose that it is plausible to say that this first sense of
'Whoever lives always is' is expressed in a categorical and the second in a hypothetical
(e.g., 'If any person lives, he exists always'). In such a case the original expression
is an example of the second mode of composition and division. But surely if one
can take the second sense as expressed in a hypothetical, one can take the first
sense as expressed in a hypothetical (e.g., 'If any person lives always, he exists'). In
such a case, the original expression must still be considered an example of the first
mode. It must be considered one all the more, since, given their similarity, it would
be irrational to treat the one sense as hypothetical and the other as categorical.
Rationality dictates that each sense be taken as categorical or each as hypothetical.
These considerations notwithstanding, it is theoretically possible for someone to take
one sense as categorical and the other as hypothetical in such cases. Yet Ockham's
characterization of the two modes of composition and division does not take into
account this possibility. For that reason, one can see that Ockham does not adequately
distinguish the modes. For that reason as well, I doubt that Ockham is correct in
claiming that his account of composition and division in terms of categoricals and
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other hand, the expression 'Everything possible if it is necessary is
true' (Omne possibile si est necessarium est υerum) appears to be an
example of the second mode of composition and division, since one
of its senses is naturally expressed in a categorical sentence, and the
other in a hypothetical: 'Everything possible-if-ίt-is-necessary is true',
and 'If everything possible is necessary, everything possible is true'.
Now given that Ockham's description of the modes of composition
and division in Summa logίcae is in terms of two senses designatable as
the compounded sense and the divided sensey the question one will want
to ask is, On what basis does Ockham distinguish a compounded sense
from a divided sense? Why, for instance, should 'Everything possible-
if-it-is-necessary is true' be considered the compounded sense rather
than the divided sense of the expression 'Everything possible if it
is necessary is true', since what is apparently the divided sense in
this case seems to result from nothing other than a different way of
composing or putting together the elements of the original expression:
i.e., 'Everything possible if-it-is-necessary is true'? Although most
medieval philosophers before Ockham maintain that the compounded
sense is the sense that is expressed when what is more naturally suited
to be compounded is compounded (under some interpretation or other
of 'naturally suited'),12 Ockham says nothing of the sort.13 What he
hypotheticals is supported by the examples Aristotle gives. However, it may well be
that some account in terms of categoricals and hypotheticals other than the one
Ockham gives is compatible with Aristotle's examples.
12. For example, some of Ockham's predecessors might say that in the case of
the expression 'Whoever lives always is', the compounded sense is the one that
results when the word 'always' is taken as governing the principal verb, and the
divided sense the one that results when the word 'always' is taken as governing
the subordinate verb. That 'always' is naturally suited to be compounded with the
principal verb is defended on the grounds that the principal or main verb in an
expression plays the role of a verb more than does the verb of the subordinate clause
in the same expression insofar as there is no complete thought, no sentence without
it. At least this is the way Lambert of Auxerre puts it: "nam verbum principale magis
se habet in natura verbi quam verbum non principale vel implicativum.. . ." See his
Logica (Summa Lamberti), ed. Franco Alessio, Pubblicazioni della Facolta di Lettere e
Filosofia dell'Universita di Milano 59 (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1971), p. 156.
13. As it turns out, Ockham does tell us how to distinguish the compounded and
divided senses in modal contexts. According to him, a (genuine) modal proposition
is one in which a mode ('true', 'false', 'possible', 'necessary', and so on) can be
taken with a dictum (an expression in indirect discourse, where both the subject and
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does say is that it is up to a person to say what he would like and to
take the words 'compounded' and 'divided' as he pleases.14 We will
not, then, get from Ockham the help we need to identify one sense
of an ambiguous expression as the compounded sense, the other as
the divided sense.
At one point in Summa logicae, Ockham even goes so far as to say
that he does not care how composition and division are described,
"since I don't think that knowing this is very useful for the special
sciences, although knowing how to draw distinctions regarding such
expressions is very useful."15 Presumably if he does not care how com'
position and division are described, he does not care, once again, in
what way the compounded sense and the divided sense are described.
Nor does he care whether one sense is distinguished as a compounded
sense rather than a divided sense or vice versa. For one cannot non^
arbitrarily distinguish the senses unless one has a view about why
one sense is called compounded and the other divided. Once one has
formulated such a view, however, one has thereby committed oneself
predicate are in the accusative case and the copula is an infinitive). A compounded
sense of the modal proposition is expressed when the modal term is predicated of the
dictum of the original proposition, and a divided sense is expressed when the modal
term is predicated of a sentence whose predicate is the predicate of that dictum, and
whose subject is the word 'this' or a pronoun standing for the referent of the subject
of that dictum. For example, 'That a white thing is black is possible' (Album esse
nigrum est possibik) is taken by Ockham to be a modal proposition, its compounded
sense being * "A white thing is black" is possible', and its divided sense being * "This
is black" is possible', where 'this' refers to something that is white. The compounded
sense is false, since a thing cannot be white and black at one and the same time; but
the divided sense is true, since some white thing (a table, say) can be black (insofar
as it can be painted) at some time other than the time at which it is white. See Super
lib. Elench. 1.3.6 (del Punta 36-37), Summa bg. 2.8.9 (Boehner 273-279) and 3.4.8
(Boehner 787). The example we are considering—'Ornne possibik si est necessarium
est verwnrΐ—is not a modal proposition according to Ockham, since it has no mode
that can be taken with a dictum. Therefore, this example is not one about which
Ockham has anything to say regarding which of its senses is compounded and which
is divided, or why those senses are to be so described.
14. Super lib. Elench. 1.3.6 (del Punta 35.45-48): "Sed ista difficultas non est
multum utilis, et magis est ad placitum hominis dicere quod voluerit et accipere
vocabula sicut placuerit quam ex re ipsa, ideo de ipsa pertranseundum est."
15. Summa log. 3.4.8 (Boehner 787.21-24): "Utrum tamen isto modo sit accip-
ienda distinctio istarum fallaciarum non multum euro, quia hoc scire non reputo
multum utile scientis specialibus, quamvis notitia distinguendi tales orationes magnam
habeat utilitatem."
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to a non-superficial theory of composition and division, and ipso facto
taken the description of composition and division to be important.
In other words, Ockham's description in Summa logicae of the modes
of composition and division with reference to the compounded sense
and the divided sense is at odds with statements he makes elsewhere
about composition and division. To make the point more forcefully:
if, as Ockham says, I can use words as I please, then suppose that
what pleases me is to understand by Compounded sense' and 'di-
vided sense' the reverse of what Ockham apparently understands by
them in Summa logicae.^ In that case, what Ockham will classify as
falling under Mode II will not fall under Mode II—or Mode I for
that matter—since the compounded sense will be hypothetical and
the divided sense categorical, and he makes no provision for this
possibility.
It is true that in Super libros Elenchorum Ockham describes the
second mode of composition and division without designating the
senses of the ambiguous expression as compounded or divided. But
this fact will not dissolve the difficulty since Super libros Elenchorum
was written before Summa logicae.^ Moreover Ockham's description
in Summa logicae of the second mode of composition and division in
terms of the compounded sense and the divided sense18 shows that he
must think that it is at least theoretically possible to distinguish what
can properly be called a compounded sense from what can properly
be called a divided sense. Indeed, both Ockham's predecessors (par-
ticularly Aristotle) and his contemporaries seem to think that there
is such a thing as composition and division, and that there is a way
to sort out by name the senses associated with these two types of
16. See above, the section "Ockham's Definition. . ."
17. According to the editors of Summa log.., the text was written in 1325 after
Ockham wrote his commentary on Aristotle's Physics, and Super lib. Elench. was
written before his commentary on the Physics (Boehner 48*). There is a basis for
maintaining, therefore, that the view of modes expressed in Summa log. is Ockham's
mature view.
18. Ockham also speaks of compounded and divided senses in connection with
the example Ήe is a good shoemaker'. See Summa log. 3.4.8 (Boehner 789.86-90):
"Similiter, ut frequenter, orationes in quibus ponitur adiectΐvum cum substantivo
distinguendae sunt, sicut tales 'iste est bonus sutor', demonstrando malum hominem.
Si sit oratio divisa, falsa est, quia tune denotatur quod est bonus et quod est sutor;
si sit composita, tune vera est, quia tune denotatur quod habet perfecte talem artem
suendi." Compare note 13 above.
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ambiguity. Given the historical context, then, as well as the evidence
of his position's internal inconsistency, Ockham needs to explain why
we needn't trouble ourselves with these details. That speakers may
take words as they please would seem in this case beside the point.
This worry about Ockham's account of the nature of composition
and division may perhaps be satisfactorily dispelled if one notices
the following. First, the two linguistic phenomena one attempts to
distinguish in the case of composition and division may not, after all,
be precisely distinguishable. Ockham's predecessors had put forward
varied and sometimes conflicting accounts of what composition and
division are, and no consensus was ever reached.19 If there were in fact
no precise way of distinguishing composition from division, that would
certainly explain why there had been no consensus.20 Second, what
Aristotle describes as the other four individual fallacies in language
(i.e., equivocation, amphiboly, accent, and figura dictionis) possess the
same general characteristic as do the alleged two fallacies he calls
composition and division. This characteristic is ambiguity arising from
two or more possible construals of a grammatical unit, where a gram-
matical unit is an expression, a word, or part of a word (e.g., a suffix).
So, for example, even though in the case of the fallacy of accent
an expression can have at least two senses depending on the way
one particular word in the expression is pronounced, those two senses
are not given technical names, nor are two different fallacies picked
out on the basis of the two possible pronunciations. I take it that for
Ockham there is no obvious reason to treat what from this perspective
looks like a single phenomenon—namely, composition/division—any
19. For various medieval accounts of composition and division, see, for example,
Dialectica Monacensis, in Logica Modernorum: A Contribution to the History of Early
Terminist Logic, ed. L. M. de Rijk, vol. 2.2 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1967); William of
Sherwood's Introduction to Logic, trans. Kretzmann; and Lambert of Auxerre Logica
(Summa Lamberti), ed. Alessio.
20. In Super lib. Elench., for example, Ockham says that wherever there is the
ambiguity of composition there is in some way the ambiguity of division, and vice
versa. The Latin reads, "Hie tamen intelligendum est quod ubicumque est fallacia
compositionis ibi est aliquo modo fallacia divisionis, et e converso. Quae autem
oratio debeat vocari composita et quae divisa, non est multum curandum" (1.3.6 [del
Punta 35.49-36.53]). It should be noted that during the scholastic period 'fallacia'
denoted what we mean today by 'ambiguity', and 'paralogismus' denoted what we
mean today by 'fallacy' or 'fallacious argument'.
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differently. Furthermore, in order to communicate effectively, to un-
derstand what is being said, or to do well in academic disputations
or logical exercises it would be important to recognize ambiguity,
although it would not matter whether the various senses associated
with that ambiguity had names. One can recognize, for example, that
the expression 'Flying planes can be dangerous' is ambiguous and that
the ambiguity depends on the possibility of taking the word 'flying' as
either an adjective modifying 'plane' or as a verb whose direct object
is 'plane'. There seems, however, to be no practical point whatsoever
in arguing for special names for these senses, because there seem to
be no characterizable phenomena other than the ambiguity broadly
picked out as equivocation.
If the three reasons just mentioned are collectively convincing as
reasons for departing from tradition, then Ockham's basic account of
compounded/divided ambiguity can be defended. In conjunction with
that defense, however, one will have to conclude that by falling back
into talk of compounded senses and divided senses in Summa logicae,
Ockham was simply being careless. One will also have to conclude
that Ockham therefore should have simply described the second mode
of composition and division as one which arises when one sense of
the ambiguous expression in question is categorical and the other
hypothetical.
Finally, assuming that the three reasons just mentioned are some-
thing like the reasons that motivated Ockham in his account of com-
position and division, that account—that departure from tradition—
can be seen as based on an application of the Principle of Parsimony:
One should never multiply entities (or their names) without good
reason.
A FURTHER REFINEMENT OF
OCKHAM'S ACCOUNT: FOUR
CONTEXTS OF COMPOSITION AND
DIVISION
Although Ockham does not think it is worthwhile to
discuss which sense is compounded and which is divided, or why, he
does take time to describe the contexts in which composition and
division arise within the two modes. He recognizes four contexts.
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(1) A context in which a conjunction is placed between two terms
in an expression, e.g., 'Five are two and three' (Quinque sunt
duo et trio), Έvery animal is rational or irrational' (Omne animal
est rationale vel irrationale), Έvery thing possible if it is necessary
is true'.
(2) A context in which one word in an expression can be joined
together with either of two other words, e.g., Whoever lives
always is'.
(3) A context in which an adjective is placed together with a
substantive term,21 e.g., Ήe is a white monk' (Iste est aϊbus
monachus).
(4) A context in which the expression involves both a dictum and
a modal term,22 e.g., Ίt is possible that a seated person walk'
(Possibile est sedentem ambulare).
In what follows, I will discuss the second and third contexts because
Ockham's discussion of them suggests that as far as he is concerned
equivocation (or something like it) is the most basic of the linguistic
fallacies—or at least is the one to which three of the six linguistic
fallacies can be reduced. A perceived reducibility to equivocation of
at least some of the standardly recognized types of ambiguity is a
second important respect in which Ockham's account of composition




In Summa logίcae Ockham tells us that when an express
sion contains a word that can be joined together with either of two
21. A term is anything that can be used as a subject, predicate, or copula in a
categorical sentence, and anything that can be used as a modifier of the subject,
predicate, or copula of such a sentence. A substantive term is a term which refers to
what would fall into the Aristotelian category of substance.
22. A dictum is an expression in indirect discourse, as for example 'that every man
is an animal'. In Latin such expressions are in the accusative/infinitive construction,
as for example ζomnem hominem esse animal*. An example of an expression involving
both a dictum and a modal term is 'That every man is an animal is necessary' (Omnem
hominem esse animal est necessarium).
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words in that expression, the expression is ambiguous with respect
to composition and division.23 We have already seen one example of
this in 'Whoever lives always is\ The expression 'Whatever anyone
knows now he has learned' (Quod quis scit nunc didicit) is a second
example insofar as its two senses can be distinguished on the basis of
punctuation or pronunciation- 'Whatever anyone knows now, he has
learned' is one reading. According to Ockham, it is true because what-
ever he now knows, he has already learned. In this case the adverb
'now' governs the word 'knows'. There is another reading: 'Whatever
anyone knows, now he has learned'. In this case 'now' governs 'has
learned', and the resulting sense is one Ockham says is false. In neither
instance does Ockham identify the sense as compounded or as divided.
Another example of an expression of this sort is 'Forty of men
one hundred left godlike Achilles' (Quadraginta υirσrum centum reliquit
dives Achilles).,24 Ockham's treatment of this example is worth explor-
ing for reasons which will become clear shortly. In Summa logicae,
Ockham classifies the Achilles example as a compounded/divided
ambiguous expression containing a word that can be joined together
either with one word or with another. In Super libros Elenchorum,
however, he says that we can see that (the senses of) 'Forty of men
one hundred left godlike Achilles' can be distinguished in accordance
with composition and division, and amphiboly, and equivocation.25
As for the analysis on the basis of composition and division, Ockham
merely tells us that there is one; he does not tell us what it is. He
says, "In the same way it can be analyzed on the basis of composition
and division, as was said."26 In his analysis of the same expression on
the basis of amphiboly, Ockham says that 'of men' (virorum) can be
construed with 'forty' or with 'one hundred' (potest construi cum li
'quadraginta' vel cum li 'centum'). Here one should not be misled into
thinking that this is really a characterization of the various senses of
23. Summa log. 3.4.8 (Boehner 789.75-76). Ockham does not explicitly consider
examples falling within this context in Super lib. Elench.
24. See Sophistici eknchi 4 (166a33-38).
25. Super lib. Elench. 1.3.6 (del Punta 39.162-174).
26. Super lib. Elench. 1.3.6 (del Punta 39.173-174): "Eodem modo potest distingui
secundum compositionem et divisionem, sicut dictum est. Et idem in multis reperitur."
I understand "sicut dictum est" as referring to the general description of an analysis
in terms of composition and division Ockham gives near the beginning of Super lib.
Elench. (del Punta 34.3-14).
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the expression in terms of composition and division insofar as
struing' sounds a lot like Combining' or 'compounding'. Recall that
Ockham defines composition and division in terms of the possibility
of distinguishing more than one sense of an expression on the basis
of different punctuation or pronunciation. Insofar as he does this,
he can describe amphiboly in terms of construing certain words with
other words27 without thereby conflating amphiboly and composition
and division.
At any rate, I take it that from Ockham's point of view, the analysis
of Torty of men one hundred left godlike Achilles' on the basis of
composition and division would yield these results: The expression
can be pronounced or punctuated either as Torty, of men one hun-
dred, left godlike Achilles' (Quadragίnta} virorum centum, reliquit dives
Achilles)—i.e., forty men remain out of the original one hundred. Or it
can be pronounced and punctuated as Torty of men, one hundred left
godlike Achilles' (Quadragίnta virorum, centum reliquit dives Achilles)—
i.e., one hundred men remain instead of the original forty. Although
the different punctuations of the English translation of the Latin
expression in question clearly are unnatural, it is unclear whether the
corresponding punctuations of the Latin translation of the original
expression in Aristotle's Greek would be considered similarly unnatu-
ral to a native speaker or to a schoolman fluent in Latin. In any event,
it seems clear that Ockham would endorse an analysis on the basis of
composition and division at least similar to the one I have presented.
In his analysis of Torty of men one hundred left godlike Achilles'
on the basis of equivocation, Ockham says that 'forty' can be taken
in either the genitive or the accusative, and that 'one hundred' can
be taken in either the accusative or the genitive. (The corresponding
Latin words 'quadragίnta' and 'centum' are indeclinable.) Equivocation
brought about in virtue of the capacity of a word or words to be taken
27. Ockham takes amphiboly to be ambiguity in an expression (as opposed to a
word) that cannot be sorted out on the basis of the way the expression is pronounced
or punctuated (Super lib. Eknch. 1.3.6 [del Punta 34.18-21]). According to him, there
are three modes or sorts of amphiboly: (a) one expression, wherever it is written or
uttered, has more than one distinguishable sense, (b) an expression has a primary
signification in virtue of a primary imposition, and a secondary signification in virtue
of a way of talking begun in connection with a special situation, and (c) an expression
uttered or written by itself has one sense, yet when put with another expression
becomes ambiguous (del Punta 177.94-103).
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in more than one grammatical case is the third mode of equivocation
recognized by Aristotle.28 When 'forty' is taken as genitive, 'men' is
the noun it determines; 'one hundred' is then taken as accusative, and
the sense of the expression is that of forty men, godlike Achilles left
one hundred.29 On the other hand, 'forty' can be taken as accusative
and 'one hundred' as genitive, in which case the sense of the expres-
sion is that of one hundred men, godlike Achilles left forty. The two
senses of the expression recognized in connection with the analysis
based on equivocation are the same two senses one must recognize
when one analyzes the expression in connection with composition
and division and in connection with amphiboly.30
On the basis of what we have just seen, I believe that Ockham's
claim that the Achilles example can be distinguished in accordance
with composition and division, amphiboly, and equivocation commits
him to the view that there is more than one plausible analysis of that
expression—one being preferable to the others. I say this because
a compounded/divided analysis of the Achilles example does not ex-
plain the existence of two possible senses of the expression in question
unless it is assumed that in virtue of pronouncing or punctuating
the expression in certain ways one comes to see which words are
28. See Sophistici eϊenchi 4 (166al4-22) and Super lib. Elench. 1.2.6 (del Punta
20.13-18). At one point Ockham says, "Multa quae hie dicuntur de istis tribus modis
aequivocationis possunt applicari ad modos amphiboliae. Quia tamen, ut frequenter,
ubi est aliquis modus amphiboliae est etiam modus aequivocationis penes tertium
modum, eo quod aliqua dictio potest esse unius casus vel alterius, vel unius numeri
vel alterius, et sic de aliis accidentibus dictionum" (Super lib. Elench. 1.2.9 [del Punta
30.173-189]).
29. Supposing that Achilles has taken forty men into battle, it is impossible that
he leave behind—to continue to fight, to be prisoners of war, or to die—one hundred
men. The state of affairs expressed in this case, then, is impossible. This is the reading
medievals seem to have in mind. See, for instance, Lambert of Auxerre's Logica
(Alessio 164.23-32). They apparently do not consider the case in which Achilles
brings sixty reinforcements to a garrison of forty.
30. Ockham tells us what the senses of the ambiguous expressions are only in
connection with the analysis in terms of equivocation. With regard to the analysis
in terms of amphiboly, he says that the senses are evident: "patet sensus" (Super lib.
Elench. 1.3.6 [del Punta 39.173]). Furthermore, Ockham states explicitly, at least in
the case of analyses on the basis of composition and division and on the basis of
amphiboly, that the senses of the ambiguous expression are the same: "Sive tamen
distinguantur penes unam fallaciam sive penes aliam dico quod sensus non variantur"'
(Summa log. 3.4.8 [Boehner 788.42-43]).
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to be construed with which other words. The compounded/divided
analysis cannot be understood except on the basis of the amphiboly
analysis. Furthermore, Ockham's amphiboly analysis of the example
does not explain the existence of two possible senses of the expression
unless it is understood that 'of men' can be determined by either
'forty' or 'one hundred'. If 'of men' is construed with 'forty', isn't it
the case that 'of men' is being taken as determined by 'forty', that
'forty' is being taken as genitive and 'one hundred' as accusative?
And if 'of men' is construed with 'one hundred', isn't 'one hundred'
taken as genitive and 'forty' as accusative? One cannot understand the
amphiboly analysis except on the basis of the equivocation analysis.
These considerations strongly suggest that some compounded/
divided ambiguous expressions, if not most or all, are ambiguous in
virtue of containing an equivocal term, and that one can describe
such ambiguous expressions at levels less precise than the proper (or
fundamental) description in terms of equivocation. In this case, the
description of the Achilles example in terms of amphiboly can be
seen as less explanatory than its description in terms of equivocation;
and the description in terms of composition and division can be seen
as even less explanatory than the description in terms of amphiboly.
Although Ockham explicitly connects equivocation, amphiboly,
and composition and division only in Super libros Elenchorumy the
views expressed in Summa logίcae are compatible with the one I claim
is expressed in Super libros Elenchσrum. And although, as I pointed out
earlier, Summa logίcae was written after Super libros Elenchσrum, Ock-
ham does not in the Summa repudiate what he says in the commentary
on this score. So, for instance, Ockham says in Summa logicae,
And to me it seems that they [i.e., expressions typically described as com-
pounded/divided ambiguous31] can be more plainly and more manifestly
analyzed in Latin in respect of amphiboly, although perhaps in Aristotle's
idiom or in Greek this kind of ambiguity in expressions of this sort is
more manifest in respect of composition and division than in respect of
amphiboly.32
31. It is not clear whether Ockham means any expression that can fall under the
head of compounded/divided ambiguity, or whether he means only a small class of
such expressions; namely, those in which both senses of the expression are categorical
or both hypothetical, or those containing a dictum and a modal term. See Summa
log. 3.4.8 (Boehner 787.38-788.42).
32. Summa log. 3.4.8 (Boehner 787.38-788.42).
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In this passage Ockham tells us that as far as he is concerned certain
compounded/divided ambiguous expressions are more plainly analyzed
in terms of amphiboly. I take it that he means by this that the analysis
in terms of amphiboly yields more information than the analysis in
terms of composition and division. And if, as I have suggested, the
analysis in terms of composition and division is broader than the
analysis in terms of amphiboly, one would of course expect the analysis
in terms of amphiboly to be the plainer, more explanatory analysis.
COMPOSITION AND DIVISION
PRODUCED BY AN ADJECTIVE
TOGETHER WITH A SUBSTANTIVE
TERM
The third context in which Ockham recognizes the com-
pounded/divided ambiguity—that in which an adjective is placed with
a substantive term—also falls under Mode I. Ockham says that Ήe
is a good shoemaker' (Iste est bonus sutor) is compounded/divided
ambiguous.33 The expression can mean either that this man is good
and that he is a shoemaker, or that this man has mastered the art of
shoemaking. Ockham goes on to say,
And although such expressions can be analyzed in accordance with com-
position and division, it seems to me that they can also be analyzed in
accordance with amphiboly, and the senses [distinguished] will not be
varied [in the two analyses]. Such propositions [as] Ήe is a white monk'
can be analyzed in the same way; in one sense it is denoted that he is
white and that he is a monk, in another sense it is denoted that he is a
monk of such-and-such an order.3"*
Although Ockham does not say here that expressions containing an
adjective and a substantive term are more plainly analyzed in terms
33. Summa log. 3.4.8 (Boehner 789.86-88). Ockham tells us that if the man who
is indicated is evil, then the first identified sense is false, the second true. I have
not seen this sort of example used in connection with composition and division by
any other medieval authors later than the twelfth-century Anonymi. For information
about them, see L. M. de Rijk's Logica Modernσrum 1. It should also be noted that
the English translation of the example is misleading. In the Latin, there is no article
'a', and so it is clearer how in Latin there can be two possible readings.
34. Summa log. 3.4.8 (Boehner 789.90-96).
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of amphiboly, he does say that they can be analyzed in terms of
amphiboly with the same results. The plausibility of my interpretation
will depend to some extent on whether expressions falling in this third
context can be analyzed in terms of equivocation as well as amphiboly
and composition and division as these are defined by Ockham. The
answer to that question is not at first glance clear. For although it
may seem reasonable to think in the case of Ήe is a white monk'
that 'white' is ambiguous and can be taken as signifying either a color
or a religious order, it may seem equally reasonable to think that
in both senses of the expression 'white' signifies a color—the color
of the monk's skin, or the color of his habit. Also, although it may
seem reasonable to think in the case of Ήe is a good shoemaker'
that 'good' is ambiguous and can be taken as signifying either moral
excellence or proficiency in a craft, it may seem equally reasonable to
think that 'good' signifies the appropriate actualization of (different)
relevant potentialities in both senses of the expression.35
I believe, however, that the controversial positions that can be
taken concerning the analyses of Ήe is a good shoemaker' and Ήe is
a white monk' suggest that there is in fact some kind of variability in
words such as 'good' and 'white'—a variability which it is altogether
appropriate to call 'equivocation' insofar as it will fall under that
mode of equivocation according to which a word is unambiguous in
isolation but becomes ambiguous when joined with another word or
expression.36 If so, this would count in Ockham's favor, since he would
then be seen as having a thesis about the reducibility of composition
and division which does not smack of arbitrariness in being restricted
to a small handful of compounded/divided ambiguous expressions. The
question, then, is how might one bring out the aforementioned kind
of variability or equivocation?
35. During the Middle Ages many philosophers (including Augustine, Boethius,
and Albert the Great) held that goodness and being are connected in an interesting
way. During the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas provides what is perhaps the
most detailed account of this connection, describing being in terms of the actual-
ization of potentiality. For an excellent discussion of Aquinas's views, see Eleonore
Stump and Norman Kretzmann, "Being and Goodness," in Divine and Human Action:
Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism, ed. Thomas V. Morris (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1988), pp. 281-312.
36. Super lib, Eknch. 1.2.6 (del Punta 20.13-8) and Sophistici elenchi 4 (166al8-
22).
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First, although in connection with the monk example 'white' can
be thought of as signifying color when the sense is that the man
belongs to a particular religious order, surely its signification in that
case is not restricted to color. The religious order could change the
color of its habit and retain the name 'white monks'. And it could do
that, I think, because a name signifies primarily its object and only
secondarily, if at all, the object's accidental characteristics. Therefore,
even if 'white' (even now) refers to the color of the robes worn by
the order's first members, it also refers to one particular religious
order irrespective of the color of its members' robes. In short, the
signification of 'white' differs in the two senses of 'He is a white monk'
if only because in one of those senses the signification is expanded or
augmented to cover more than a particular color.
Second, in connection with the shoemaker example, the variability
can be seen as associated with the signification of the term 'good',
and with the sorts of things to which the term is applied. 'Good',
unlike 'white', is what the medievals call a transcendental term (a
term which can be correctly applied to absolutely everything insofar
as it refers to what transcends Aristotle's ten categories). For instance,
one can speak of the shoemaker's being good in respect of x (making
shoes), and good in respect of y (living a moral life). Variability
associated with 'good' as used in the example has to do with the
fact that 'good' does not specify enough about the object that is
called 'good'—enough, that is, to be of use to anyone interested in
communicating; and so the word that is modified by 'good' augments
the signification of 'good' such that one understands in what way
the object referred to has potentialities and is supposed to have
realized those potentialities. The words 'appropriate' and 'relevant' in
the definition of 'good' being presupposed for our purposes (i.e., 'the
appropriate actualization of relevant potentialities') are made precise
by virtue of the words which 'good' can be connected with in a
compounded/divided ambiguous expression.37
It is possible, therefore, to make a case for expressions which fall
under the third context of composition and division being reducible
37. This is consistent with Ockham's remarks in Super lib. Elench. 2.5.5 (del
Punta 182.28-31): "Et est sciendum quod quando 'bonus' vel 'malus' per se ponitur
significat bonitatem vel malitiam moris, sed quando ponitur cum 'sutore' significat
notitiam vel ignoratitiam talis artis."
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to equivocation. It is also clear, I think, that those expressions can
in fact be characterized in terms of composition and division and
amphiboly too. I can see no reason to deny that one can indicate the
two senses of Ίste est bonus sutσr* in the following way: Ίste est, bonus
sutor' and Ίste est bonus, sutor\3S Nor do I see any reason to deny
that these two senses are distinguishable in virtue of the adjective
'bonus* functioning either as a modifier of the noun (to which it is
adjoined) or as a predicate adjective (independently modifying the
subject-term).39 The adjectival term can be construed either with
'sutor' or something else in the expression. As we saw earlier, Ock-
ham characterizes amphiboly in just this way. The third context of
composition and division, therefore, adds support to my contention
that as far as Ockham is concerned, compounded/divided ambiguity
is ultimately reducible to equivocation.
The upshot of our consideration of Ockham's remarks in Summa
logicae and Super libros Elenchσrum about composition and division
can be represented graphically. Ockham's predecessors would diagram
the relationship between certain types of ambiguity in the following
way:
Ambiguity
composition division amphiboly equivocation







38. The point I want to make here cannot be made using the English translation
of the Latin, since in order to preserve the ambiguity in the English translation, the
article 'a' would have to be omitted, rendering the English (Ήe is good shoemaker')
ungrammatical.
39. In the latter case I take the sense to be Ήe is a good man (Iste est bonus),
[and] a shoemaker'.
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If my reading is correct, Ockham finds one and the same phenomenon
where his predecessors found four. This departure from tradition might,
like the departure pointed out earlier, be seen as based on an employ-
ment of the Principle of Parsimony.
TWO PROBLEMS
One problem faced by the account of composition and
division I attribute to Ockham is of the 'so what?' variety. Some
people might maintain that the account I attribute to Ockham is no
different from the one that is transparent in Aristotle's text. Aristotle
says, for example, at one point in the Sophistίchi elenchi,
However, nothing prevents the same expression from having several ways
of failing.^ 0
It looks as if the view about the reducibility of composition and
division to equivocation I have been claiming for Ockham as in-
novative was not innovative at all, since even according to Aristotle
the classification of types of fallacies is non-exclusive.
Ockham can get around this apparent difficulty by pointing out,
first of all, that Aristotle makes this remark in the course of arguing
that those people are mistaken who try to solve a certain example of
ambiguity by saying that it turns on considering one and the same
object in different respects^1 instead of solving it by pointing out that
it depends on accident. The fallacy of accident is, however, a fallacy
independent of language, and the fallacy recognized by Aristotle's
imagined interlocutors, insofar as it at least resembles the fallacy
secundum quid et simpliciter, also seems to be independent of language.
Given the context of Aristotle's remark at 179bl7, then, it is not clear
that whatever he means, he intends that remark to apply not only to
fallacies independent of language, but to linguistic fallacies or fallacies
in language as well—this latter being what presently concerns us.
40. "Nihil autem prohibet eandem orationem plures fallendi occasiones habere."
So the text of Sophistici elenchi 24 (179bl7) as it appears in De Sophisticis Elenchis,
ed. Bernard G. Dod, AL 6.1-3 (Leiden: E J. Brill, 1975).
41. Sophistici elenchi 24 (179blO—11) as in AL 6.1-3: "eundem quidem nosse et
ignorare dicunt, sed non secundum idem."
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Ockham can also point out that although Aristotle does say that
fallacies independent of language can be reduced to ignoratio elenchi^2
it would be surprising to find him making a similar claim about
linguistic fallacies, since he thinks not only that there must be a
certain number of such fallacies (six), but thinks that this can be
proved by induction and by syllogism.^3 My claim, then, that Ockham
was doing something innovative still stands.
A second problem for the account of composition and division I at-
tribute to Ockham is the following. Even if the account is supported by
what Ockham says in connection with the second and third contexts
of composition and division, unless it is likewise supported by what
can be said about the first and fourth contexts, there is no reason to
think that Ockham either believes or is committed to believing that
composition/division is reducible to, or has as its source, equivocation.
I believe that one can at least begin to make a case for the first
and fourth contexts also being reducible to equivocation. Consider, for
instance, Tive are three and two', which exemplifies the first context
because in it a conjunction is placed between two terms. The two
readings of Tive are three and two' are Tive are (three and two)' and
Tive are three, and five are two'. One can see that 'and' is not the
same operator on both readings. On the second reading 'and' is used
as an operator for sentential conjunction; on the first, 'and' is used
as an operator for arithmetical summation, where the arguments are
numbers and not sentences. 'And' can thus be seen as the equivocal
term in this case.
Consider, also, 'It is possible that Peter speaks French'. This exam-
pie falls within the fourth context because it involves both a dictum
and a modal term. The two readings in this case are '"Peter speaks
French" is possible' and 'It is possible for Peter to speak French'.
'Possible', however, is not the same operator on both readings. On
the first it is used epistemically, indicating that for all I know Peter
speaks French. On the second it is used performatively, indicating that
Peter has the ability to speak French.44 Or consider 'It is possible that
42. Sophistici elenchi 6 (168al7-19).
43. Sophistici elenchi 4 (165b27-29).
44. This second reading is ambiguous in its own right insofar as the ability referred
to can be either realized (as in the case of a skill) or unrealized (as in the case of
a mere power).
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a seated person walk'. The two readings in this case are ' "A seated
person is walking" is possible' and 'It is possible for this individual
(namely, the one who happens to be sitting) to walk'. Once again,
'possible' is not the same operator on both readings. On the first it
modifies a sentence and is used absolutely, indicating that the state
of affairs expressed by that sentence does not violate the law of non-
contradiction (i.e., is self-consistent); on the second it modifies a
term, indicating that the thing referred to by that term has a particular
ability. In each of these examples 'possible' can be seen as an equivocal
term which modifies either a sentence or a term therein.45
It is not clear, therefore, that the move Ockham makes to connect
in some way the analyses of certain ambiguous expressions in terms of
composition and division and equivocation cannot be made for them
all in such a way that we see a full-fledged theory emerging.
CONCLUSION
If my reading of Ockham is correct, one sees Ockham
during the early fourteenth century, razor in hand, attempting to bring
order to a rather unwieldy century's worth of medieval accounts of
composition and division. The result is his rejection of the view that
Aristotle was correct in thinking that he had identified in the Sophis-
tichί elenchi six distinct linguistic fallacies. This rejection is suggestive.
If 'composition' and 'division' are two names for one apparent type of
ambiguity, and this type of ambiguity is reducible to equivocation, and
amphiboly is reducible to equivocation, are accent and figura dictionis
also reducible to equivocation? I think that a case can be made for
their being so.
First, in connection with accent, one can point out that particular
words as they are written simply do have more than one sense. Take,
45. Notice that the first readings of the two examples involving 'possible' depend
on non-linguistic facts. On the basis of syntactical considerations it would be difficult
to argue that even these first readings are not ambiguous insofar as 'possible' can in
each case be taken epistemically or absolutely: 'For all I know Peter speaks French'
and 'Peter's speaking French is a self-consistent state of affairs'; 'For all I know a
sitting person is walking' and Ά sitting person's walking is a self-consistent state
of affairs'. I will not speculate about why under ordinary circumstances we tend to
ignore one of the two readings.
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for example, i*n*v*a-l*i*d, which is in one of its senses appropriate to
use in describing an argument, in the other sense a person. Second,
in connection with figura dictionis, one could say with plausibility
that given the various functions a particular prefix or suffix can serve,
particular words which include them simply do have more than one
sense. Take, for example, 'desirable', which can mean either 'is worthy
of being desired' or 'can be desired'.46 One could, then, construct
diagrams for accent and figura dictionis similar to the diagram Ockham
would construct for amphiboly and composition and division. In other
words, the case can be made that there is only one linguistic fallacy,
and it is equivocation.
This result, though it conflicts with what Aristotle says about
ambiguity in the Sophistichi elenchi, might nevertheless be greeted by
Aristotle with approval. I say this because, as I pointed out earlier, it
is Aristotle's view that the seven fallacies that arise independently of
language are reducible to one—ignoratio elenchi. Its turning out that
the six fallacies that arise in language are also reducible to one—to
equivocation—makes for a satisfying symmetry.
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46. Some accuse John Stuart Mill of failing to notice this ambiguity in his
defense of the principle of utility. See, for example, G. E. Moore in Principia Ethica
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), chapter 3.
